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Abstract
This paper solves the pricing problem of an emerging market debt contract in which the
borrower’s economy is subject to rare event risk. Our model combines elements of a reduced-
form and a structural model of debt pricing. Rare event risk is modeled as a sudden event in
fundamentals, and we study the role of the debt contract in providing risk sharing between
the borrower and the lender. The two main frictions under consideration in our equilibrium
model are limited participation of the lender through the debt contract, and heterogeneous
beliefs between the borrower and the lender about the likelihood of a rare event. We solve
for the rate of interest, the credit spread, the risk premium, the write-oﬀ (recovery rate) in
case of default, and the dynamics of the debt contract in non-default times. We ﬁnd that
limited participation combined with heterogeneous beliefs has strong eﬀects on the level and
variability of the debt contract properties.
Keywords: Rare Event Risk, Emerging Markets, Exchange Economy, Jump-Diﬀusion Model,
Heterogeneous Beliefs, Incomplete Market.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D51, D52, E43, F34, G12.1 Introduction
Emerging market economies are often subject to rare event risk which can severely aﬀect
their aggregate productivity. We think of rare event risk as risks originating from natural
or man-made catastrophes, terrorism, or risks due to political instability.1 In this paper we
provide an equilibrium solution to the pricing problem faced by a lender, for example an
international ﬁnancial institution, the IMF, or the Worldbank, on an investment decision in
an emerging market country subject to rare event risk through a debt contract.
Our pricing exercise is based in the following primitives. We model a borrower’s economy
that is subject to rare event risk in addition to regular economic risk. Both types of risk
are systematic. A risk averse lender can only invest in the borrower’s economy through
a debt contract, which is consistent with the very low levels of foreign direct investment
observed in emerging markets. Furthermore, the borrower and the lender might not agree
on the likelihood of a rare event which is a natural assumption since the true frequency of
rare events is unknown. Hence, the two main frictions of the model are limited participation
and heterogenous beliefs. The purpose of our work is to study how these frictions aﬀect the
pricing of a risky debt contract in an equilibrium setting.2 We fully specify the dynamics
of the debt contract in terms of economic fundamentals, in particular the rate of interest,
the credit spread, the risk premium, the write-oﬀ (recovery rate) in case of default, and the
dynamics of the debt contract in non-default times. The dynamic nature of our model also
allows us to describe how the borrower and the lender are aﬀected in terms of their ﬁnancial
wealth, and how the interest rate and the write-oﬀ adjust at the occurrence of default.
1A recent example of a natural catastrophe with severe a impact was triggered on December 26, 2004,
when a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred oﬀ the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. This was the fourth
largest earthquake in the world since 1900. The earthquake generated tsunamis which swept across the
Indian Ocean. The worst aﬀected country was Indonesia - Aceh province; over 120,000 people lost their lives
in this disaster. The World Bank has estimated total economic damages and losses caused by the earthquake
and tsunami at approximately US$ 4.45 billion, or almost 100 percent of Aceh’s GDP in 2003. The tsunamis
also aﬀected Phuket and surrounding areas in Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, and places in Africa.
2In the Appendix, we show how to relax the assumption of zero foreign direct investment (FDI). In
particular, we discuss how the interest rate, write-oﬀ, and the variability of the credit spread is aﬀected once
the lender diverts a small amount of her investment directly into the productive assets of the borrower.
1To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to study the eﬀect of heterogeneous beliefs about
rare events on the pricing of risky debt. We ﬁnd that the debt’s interest rate is decreasing
in the belief of the lender, but increasing in the belief of the borrower. The impact of
heterogeneity can be large enough such that the borrower is willing to pay an interest rate to
the lender which is signiﬁcantly higher than the fundamental’s growth rate, as often observed
for emerging market economies.3 Both directions are linked to the endogeneity of the optimal
write-oﬀ on the debt contract in case of default.4 The debt write-oﬀ is decreasing in the
belief of the borrowing agent, but increasing in the belief of the lending agent.
Our model delivers strong eﬀects on the variability in non-default times. It generates stochas-
tic interest rates, credit spreads, and risk premiums. We show how a levered economy com-
bined with heterogeneous beliefs leads to equilibrium volatilities possibly several times higher
than under homogeneity. Under belief homogeneity, we would not observe any variation in
credit spreads and the risk premium, and the (small) variation in the interest rate is entirely
due to variation in the “shadow” riskless interest rate.
We calibrate the model to economic fundamentals and historical credit spreads of Ecuador.
The country defaulted in August 1999 due to rare event risk and completed an exchange
oﬀer for their external debt in July 2000. Our results suggest that recovery rates (write-oﬀ
values) on external debt, interpreted solely from a risk sharing perspective, should have been
higher (lower) than ex-post observed values. While we are not claiming that heterogeneity
in beliefs and leverage should explain all observed volatility in credit spreads, our results
do, however, suggest that a moderate degree of dispersion can explain a signiﬁcant fraction
of Ecuador’s observed volatility. Since debt pricing models generally neglect heterogeneous
beliefs, it is unknown to what extent this friction can contribute to the stochastic nature of
observed prices.
3In Table 1, we show estimates of the growth rate of aggregate output for the emerging market economies
Ecuador, Indonesia, Panama, and the Philippines to be 5.00%, 5.03%, 4.47%, and 5.13%, respectively.
The mean real interest rates for these economies for the same time period are 11.11%, 8.70%, 9.77%, and
5.13%, respectively, based on annual observations according to the Global Development Finance and World
Development Indicators.
4Most sovereign debt defaults lead to ex-post negotiations about debt recovery in the absence of a sovereign
bankruptcy code. Our model suggests debt-write oﬀ values solely from the perspective of risk sharing. It
does therefore carry potential implications important for the ongoing discussion, how a sovereign bankruptcy
framework should be structured, see Bolton and Skeel (2004).
2Our pricing approach builds on the limited market participation model of Basak and Cuoco
(1998), since a lender participates in the borrower’s economy only through a debt contract.5
Once the borrower’s economy faces rare event risk in addition to regular economic risk,
riskless borrowing becomes infeasible. The intuition for this result can be derived even from
a partial equilibrium perspective. Suppose a price system faces rare events, and a levered
portfolio optimizer is one jump away from ruin, then he will not be able to quickly reverse his
portfolio in order to avoid negative wealth. Hence, as shown for example by Liu, Longstaﬀ
and Pan (2003), the optimal portfolio is one where the investor does not engage in a levered
position. Taking this intuition to our equilibrium pricing exercise in a levered economy that
does face rare event risk, this in turn implies that the debt contract can not be riskless, but
should allow for a risk sharing opportunity when a rare event occurs.
In light of the previous result, it should not seem surprising that many countries facing
rare events default on outstanding debt contracts. In fact, it is optimal for the borrower
to do so, and to shift some exposure of the impact of a rare event to the lender. Four
recent examples from emerging market countries, in which a dramatic exogenous shock
corresponded to default on debt, are Ecuador, Indonesia, Panama, and the Philippines.6 To
motivate the dynamics of our exogenous state variable, we carry out the following estimation.




= ¹edt + ¾edB(t) + ·edN(t;¸);
where ¹e;¾e;·e; and ¸ serve as the deterministic growth rate, the volatility parameter, the
jump size, and the jump intensity, respectively. Estimation is carried out via maximum like-
lihood. The data set consists of yearly observations between 1974 and 2003 for the countries
mentioned. The results are displayed in Table 1, and the estimation procedure clearly iden-
tiﬁes the extreme shock, with an insigniﬁcant low frequency. For example, according to this
5Basak and Cuoco (1998) analyze properties of risk premia in the stock market given a levered economy,
while our extension with rare event risk analyses the properties of the debt contract given a levered economy.
6More detailed country-speciﬁc information about defaults and recovery rates can be found in Moody’s
(2003) and Standard and Poor’s (2002). Details on the case of Ecuador can be found in Section 4. For the
case of Indonesia, there was a sovereign debt default, a banking collapse, and mass corporate bankruptcy in
1998.
3estimator, Ecuador’s GDP exhibited a negative jump of -16.77%. For all of these countries,
the identiﬁed negative jump led to default on outstanding debt.

































Table 1: GDP Dynamics of Less Developed Countries. The data set is generated from The
World Economy, OECD Development Centre, Paris 2003, consisting of yearly observations between
1974 and 2003. Estimation is carried out via maximum likelihood, and the t-statistics are displayed
in parenthesis below the point estimates.
Our equilibrium pricing exercise carries elements from both reduced-form as well as struc-
tural models of defaultable debt. The default decision is modelled in reduced form since an
exogenously triggered rare event leads to default on the debt contract. From this perspec-
tive our paper relates to the family of models that treat default as an unpredictable sudden
event, like Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1995), or Duﬃe and
Singleton (1999). Our pricing model also relates to the family of structural models in which
prices are derived from economic fundamentals. The ﬁrst generation of structural models
includes for example Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976). In these models a defaultable
bond is a contingent claim on the borrower’s assets, and interest rate and recovery rate are
endogenously determined. The second generation of structural models includes for example
Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). Although these
models allow for more complex capital structures and bond prices are determined by asset
fundamentals, the recovery rate is an exogenous value and independent of the value of assets.
Because of the endogeneity of the recovery rate, our pricing approach is similar in spirit to
the ﬁrst generation of structural models, in addition to being an equilibrium model.
The borrower in our pricing exercise is potentially a sovereign country. One strand of the
literature explores the question how much the willingness to repay debt aﬀect debt prices.
4Sovereign debt literature dealing with the role of reputation and sanctions includes Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), as well as Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a, 1989b). Gibson and Sundaresan
(2001) provide a model based on trade sanctions to quantify the diﬀerence between corporate
and sovereign yields spreads due to the absence of a bankruptcy code. In a more recent paper,
Yue (2005) provides a dynamic model that captures endogenous default risk and endogenous
recovery, also based on debt renegotiation. In our model, the borrower does not trade oﬀ
debt payments against costs of reputation, costs of international trade restrictions, or costs
of having assets seized that are held abroad. Our model also does not build up on the
small open economy framework, which is based on a risk averse borrower and a risk neutral
ﬁnancial intermediary. Since our pricing exercise is a risk sharing question with respect to a
systematic source of uncertainty, we support the setup of a risk averse borrower and a risk
averse lender. At the heart of the equilibrium pricing is the generation of a risk premium
implicit in the interest rate of the debt contract, on which the borrower and the lender need
to agree.
In other theoretical work on sovereign debt, Claessens and Pennachi (1996) provide a
structural model for the pricing of Brady bonds. An (unobserved) state variable serves as
an indicator that governs the country’s ability to repay. Subsequently, default is deﬁned as a
stopping time associated with this state variable. The authors apply the model to Mexican
Brady bond prices between 1990 and 1995, and analyze properties of the extracted state
variable. Duﬃe, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003) propose a reduced-form model within the
class of aﬃne term structure models to study Russian bond data between 1994 and 2000.
The sample period includes Russia’s default on sovereign debt in 1998. They show how
prices can be obtained using a “default risk-adjusted” short rate model, and successfully
estimate the model using maximum likelihood. Our model allows us to go a step further
by endogenizing the expected loss given default as well as the default risk premium, and
linking its structure to the process of economic fundamentals. In addition, we show how the
stochastic nature of interest rates and credit spreads in non-default times can be an outcome
of the combined eﬀect of limited participation in the borrower’s economy, and the dispersion
of the borrower’s and the lender’s beliefs about the likelihood of default.
Our structural approach is further motivated by the empirical ﬁnding that measures of
a less-developed country’s ability to repay its outstanding debt seem to explain the level of
borrowing rates and their dynamics. Edwards (1984) empirically measures the signiﬁcance
of several variables to explain the level of the sovereign debt yield spread of 19 less-developed
5countries between 1976 and 1980. He shows that the debt-output ratio (as measured by the
ratio of total debt to GNP), an indicator for the degree of solvency, is a signiﬁcant explanatory
variable. In a similar study, Boehmer and Megginson (1990) investigate empirically whether
liquidity or solvency factors can explain the price dynamics for syndicated loans of 12 less
developed countries between 1985 and 1988. They ﬁnd that the country’s ability to repay
outstanding debt (as measured by the ratio of total long-term debt to GNP and by the
ratio of long-term debt to total exports) signiﬁcantly explains the changes in secondary
market prices. Ming (1998) performs a similar analysis on emerging market bond spreads,
and conﬁrms the importance of solvency variables. All of these empirical studies directly
support the pricing approach taken in our paper, as we are modeling a solvency variable
endogenously, which in turn determines the level and variability of the interest rate.
Empirical papers dealing with rare events in equity markets include early work by Jorion
(1988), as well as more recent analysis by Eraker (2004), and Das and Uppal (2004). Johannes
(2004) explicitly analyzes jumps in interest rate markets, and Piazzesi (2005) provides a term
structure model which integrates Federal Reserve actions into bond prices. With rare events,
the problem of contingent claim pricing is ﬁrst considered by Merton (1976); the problem
of portfolio selection is considered, for example by Merton (1971), Aase (1984), and Liu,
Longstaﬀ and Pan (2003). For an equilibrium treatment, Rietz (1988) adds a catastrophic
state to the Arrow-Debreu exchange economy. Naik and Lee (1990) study an equilibrium
model with rare events in order to price European options. Back (1991) studies a broad class
of processes for which rare event risk premiums exist, and shows how a non-zero jump risk
premium is linked to jumps in the pricing kernel. More recently, Barro (2005) extends Rietz’s
(1988) framework with a default probability and addresses the equity premium puzzle and
real interest rates puzzle in developed nations in the last century. While Barro (2005) assumes
homogeneity and a complete markets economy, our setup is based on limited participation
through a debt contract and we endogenize the recovery rate.7
Our paper is structured a follows. Section 2 describes the economy under consideration
and provides the pricing results of the debt contract, i.e. the interest rate, the write-oﬀ,
the credit spread, and the risk premium. In Section 3, we analyze the properties of the
7Dieckmann and Gallmeyer (2005) add heterogeneity in risk aversion, and study a capital market in
which the more risk averse optimally insures the less risk averse agent against rare events. Dieckmann (2004)
analyzes an exchange economy with rare event risk, while focusing on the diﬀerence between complete and
incomplete capital markets and the non-availability of insurance.
6debt contract and the dynamic behavior in default and non-default times. In Section 4 we
calibrate the model to data from Ecuador, and Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix we
show a perturbation of the model allowing for a small degree of foreign direct investment,
with a re-calibration to the case of Ecuador.
2 The Economy
First, we introduce the primitives of the economy and formalize the debt contract. Second,
after stating the optimization problem, we solve for the equilibrium price characteristics of
the debt contract. Additionally, we derive benchmark economies without rare event risk and
without heterogeneous beliefs about rare event risk, respectively.
Our model is a continuous time generalization of a Lucas (1978) pure exchange economy
with two agents. The ﬁrst agent (i = b) represents a sovereign country which has access to its
aggregate output process. At the same time this country acts as a borrower in the sovereign
debt market. The second agent (i = l) represents a lender in the sovereign debt market.
Both agents (i = b;l) observe the realization of the country’s aggregate output process with
the following exogenous dynamics:
de(t)
e(t¡)
= b ¹edt + ¾edB(t) + ·edN(t;¸i(t)); (i = b;l): (1)
The output process carries two sources of uncertainty, small (regular) economic risk and
rare event risk, as often observed in the case of emerging market countries. To capture the
former, the economy is subject to uncertainty that enters through a one-dimensional standard
Brownian motion B(t): The extent of small economic risks is given by the instantaneous
volatility parameter ¾e; which is strictly positive, ¾e > 0: To capture rare event risk, the
economy is subject to uncertainty that enters through a one-dimensional Poisson process
N(t) with intensity parameter ¸:8 The extent of rare event risk is given by the jump size
parameter ·e: We restrict the jump size to ·e 2 (¡1;0) in order to induce negative jumps and
8The Brownian motion is deﬁned on a probability space
¡
ΩB;FB;PB¢




: We deﬁne (Ω;F;P) as the product probability space and the ﬁltration
of the combined history as fFtg = FB
t £ FN
t :
7to ensure that the output process always remains positive. Heterogeneity in beliefs about
the likelihood of rare events (leading to subsequent default) is captured by each agent’s
subjective belief about the true frequency, ¸i(t):9 We formulate a competitive equilibrium,
in which none of the agents knows the true frequency, and both fully agree to disagree on
each other’s belief. The coeﬃcient b ¹e serves as the deterministic growth rate. Alternatively,
we can write the output process under a compensated Poisson process as
de(t)
e(t¡)
= (¹e;i(t) ¡ ·e¸i(t))dt + ¾edB(t) + ·edN(t;¸i(t)); (2)
which implies b ¹e = ¹e;i(t) ¡ ·e¸i(t): Under this notation, ¹e;i(t) serves as the instantaneous
mean growth rate of the output process under agent i’s belief.10
The rare event risk inherent in the borrower’s economy is the source of uncertainty
linked to the default behavior. The default decision is modeled in reduced form, since
a sudden shock in economic fundamentals of magnitude ·e leads to default in the debt
market. However, we will show in the next section that this link between the occurrence
of a rare event and default is needed to obtain an equilibrium solution. Riskless borrowing
for a levered sovereign country facing rare event risk in addition to regular economic risk is
9One might argue that disagreement on the extent of a rare event is more realistic than disagreement on
the frequency. We consider these here as equivalent frictions, as long as the support for jump sizes is ﬁnite.
Suppose a rare event can have either small or large impact. After decomposing the jump size uncertainty
into a sum of two Poisson events with constant (small and large) jump sizes, one can subsume the small
jump into the more general Brownian motion risk. What is left is a Poisson process with a large jump size,
and disagreement on the frequency of occurrence. In other words, disagreement on the extent of the impact
of a rare event can be interpreted as disagreement on the frequency of large rare event risk, which is the rare
event that matters for our analysis. For a more rigorous treatment of multiple jump sizes, see Dieckmann
(2004) and Dieckmann and Gallmeyer (2005.)
10Since both agents observe the same process, agreement on the path of e(t) requires the consistency
condition
b ¹e = ¹e;i(t) ¡ ·e¸i(t); (i = b;l):
The diﬀerence in mean growth rates can be expressed in terms of the diﬀerence in beliefs about default, and
must hold at all points in time,
¹e;b(t) ¡ ¹e;l(t) = ·e(¸b(t) ¡ ¸l(t)):
8impossible, since ﬁnancial wealth might become negative. We assume that smaller risks in
economic fundamentals will not lead to default. Investment by the lender in the borrower’s
economy occurs through a debt contract with the price process,
dD(t)
D(t¡)
= b ¹D(t)dt + ·D(t)dN(t;¸i(t)); D(0) > 0; (3)
= (¹D;i(t) ¡ ¸i(t)·D(t))dt + ·D(t)dN(t;¸i(t)):
For simplicity, this is a non-dividend paying security and behaves like a defaultable money
market account. The initial value D(0) is given exogenously. A long position in D(t) classiﬁes
a lender; a short position in D(t) classiﬁes a borrower. The annual interest rate of borrow-
ing/lending is given by b ¹D(t): Hence, the borrowing agent pays the amount D(t¡)b ¹D(t)dt to
the lending agent every instant of time. The impact of default is captured by the write-oﬀ
parameter ·D(t); such that 1¡·D(t) represents the recovery rate. The notions “recovery of
market value” and “recovery of face value” are equivalent in our formulation. In the case
of an extreme shock to the output process triggered by dN(t;¸); it is optimal to write-oﬀ
the sovereign debt contract by the amount D(t¡)·D(t): The interest rate b ¹D(t), and the
write-oﬀ parameter ·D(t) are posited to be fFtg measurable, and to be determined jointly in
equilibrium. In a complete market frictionless economy, the write-oﬀ parameter ·D(t) would
not be determined in equilibrium, since D(t) is a non-dividend paying security. However, in
our incomplete market economy with limited market participation and an exogenous initial
amount of total debt, the write-oﬀ parameter ·D(t) can be uniquely determined.
Agents have the following endowment structure at the beginning of the economy. The
borrower is endowed with the present value of the entire output stream, denoted V (0):
Simultaneously, the borrower has issued mD(0) debt contracts, where mD(0) > 0. Hence,
the borrower’s initial ﬁnancial wealth is given by Wb(0) = V (0) ¡ mD(0)D(0); which leads
to the restriction that the initial amount of borrowing is limited by mD(0)D(0) < V (0):
The lender’s initial ﬁnancial wealth is Wl(0) = mD(0)D(0): The amount mD(0)D(0) can
also be interpreted as the initial amount of “leverage” for the borrower. In equilibrium, the
ﬁnancial wealth of both agents remains strictly positive at all times. In our formulation, the
investor is constrained to participate in the borrower’s economy through the sovereign debt
contract. This is in line with very low levels of foreign direct investment observed for less
developed countries.11 To formalize this, let agent i’s fraction of wealth invested in asset j
11For example, according to World Bank statistics, the average FDI in Ecuador between 1970 and 2004
9be denoted by ¼j:i; where j 2 fD;V g can either be the debt contract D(t) or the value of the
“unlevered” economy V (t): The participation constraint corresponds to ¼V;b(t)Wb(t) = V (t),
¼V;l(t) = 0, and ¼D;l(t) = 1 at all points in time.
We propose the following dynamics for the process for an agent-speciﬁc pricing kernel to
be veriﬁed in equilibrium:
d´i(t)
´i(t¡)








The parameters µi and ¸Q;i serve as the market price of diﬀusive risk associated with the
Brownian motion, and the risk-adjusted jump intensity associated with the Poisson process,
respectively. Note, ¸Q;i is the risk-adjusted parameter, and not the risk neutral equivalent.
The proposed capital market is incomplete since the only security available to share risk is
the debt contract. We verify later that in equilibrium the coeﬃcient ®(t) is equal to the
term ¡·2
D(t)¸i ¡ ·D(t)¸i + ¸Q;i(t)·D(t): Note that ®(t) does not carry a subscript i, as the
value is not agent-speciﬁc. Furthermore, the expectation of
d´i(t)






= [¡b ¹D(t) ¡ ®(t) ¡ ·D(t)¸i(t)]dt (5)
= [¡b ¹D(t) + ·D(t)(·D(t)¸i(t) ¡ ¸Q;i(t))]dt:
One can interpret the right hand side of equation 5 as the “shadow” riskless rate. This value
is agent-speciﬁc, and there would is disagreement about it between agents. If there is no rare
event risk in the economy, ·e(t) = 0; then the right hand side of equation 5 yields ¡r(t)dt,
with full agreement on the riskless rate.
The borrower and the lender solve an optimization problem over a ﬁnite horizon in
an expected utility framework by being endowed with logarithmic utility. They choose a
nonnegative consumption process ci: Using martingale techniques, see Karatzas, Lehoczky
was 2% of GDP. In the Appendix we relax the assumption of zero FDI, and provide the new debt contract
properties for a small amount of FDI.
10and Shreve (1987), Cox and Huang (1989) as well as Bardhan and Chao (1996),12 a static














The optimal consumption policy can be determined from the inverse of each agent’s
marginal utility and yields ci(t) = (yi´i(t))
¡1 : The parameter yi serves as the Lagrangian
multiplier from agent i’s constrained optimization. After solving for the value of yi, ﬁnancial
wealth simpliﬁes to Wi(t) = ci(t)(T ¡t): Its dynamics, while focusing on the terms generated
by Brownian and Poisson uncertainty, relate to the inverse of the agent-speciﬁc state price
density process ´i given by
dWi(t)
Wi(t¡)







Deﬁnition 1 Given both agent’s preferences and endowments, a Walrasian equilibrium is
a collection of allocations (cb;¼j;b) and (cl;¼j;l); and a price system for the sovereign debt
market (b ¹D(t);·D(t)), such that (cb;¼j;b) and (cl;¼j;l) are optimal solutions to the agent’s
optimization problem. All markets clear at t 2 [0;T]:
cb(t) + cl(t) = e(t);
Wb(t) + Wl(t) = V (t);
¼V;b(t)Wb(t) = V (t); (borrower has access to the economy)
¼D;b(t)Wb(t) + ¼D;l(t)Wl(t) = 0: (debt market clearing)
We now solve for the equilibrium of this economy, and ﬁnd it convenient to construct a
representative agent (RA) with a state-dependent weight Á(t). A RA utility function where
the ﬁrst weight is normalized to unity can be formulated as
U(e(t);Á(t)) = max log(cb(t)) + Á(t)log(cl(t)); s:t: cb(t) + cl(t) = e(t):
As usual, optimality and consumption good clearing imply that the RA’s marginal utility
equates to ﬁrst agent’s state price density, i.e.
12Bardhan and Chao (1996) study an exchange economy with rare events where multiple agents can trade





















The approach to formulate a RA with state-dependent weights was introduced by Cuoco and
He (1994), and recent examples can be found in Basak and Cuoco (1998) or Gallmeyer and
Holliﬁeld (2004). The value of Á(t) needs to be strictly positive in order to guarantee existence
of an equilibrium, which will be directly veriﬁed in equilibrium. A shortcut to determine
the present value of the output process, V (t), is to use the market clearing conditions. As
Wi(t) = ci(t)(T ¡ t); imposing good market clearing leads directly to V (t) = e(t)(T ¡ t):
Hence, after computing the dynamics of V (t); the instantaneous volatility and the jump size
are the same values as for the output process, i.e. ¾e and ·e; respectively.
The market prices of diﬀusive risk can be determined as in an equilibrium model in
which one agent holds the entire exposure of diﬀusive risk, but the other agent stays entirely
sidelined, as in Basak and Cuoco (1998). With this restricted risk sharing, it must be the
case that µb(t) = ¾e(1 + Á(t¡)) and µl(t) = 0; and the dynamics of equation (9) reduce to
dÁ(t)
Á(t¡)








Note that the dynamics of the weighting process do not depend on b ¹D(t) and ®(t): These
coeﬃcients are not agent-speciﬁc and therefore drop out of the weighting process. Our
equilibrium pricing exercise involves determining the following four processes: the interest
rate b ¹D(t); the risk-adjusted intensity for the borrowing agent ¸Q;b(t); the risk-adjusted
intensity for the lender ¸Q;l(t); and the write-oﬀ in case of default ·D(t): In the following,
we state four equilibrium conditions, which allow us to uniquely identify the solution.
12Condition 1: The borrower has access to the entire aggregate output process, and under
her pricing kernel the value of the economy must equal V (t): Since V (t) = e(t)(T ¡ t) as









= e(t)(T ¡ t): (11)
After imposing optimality,
1+Á(t)
e(t)yb = ´b(t); this condition requires that the weighting process
is a martingale under the sovereign’s measure Pb; Eb;t[Á(s)] = Á(t); for all s > t. Equivalently
we require




Condition 2: The lender is exposed to the entire risky debt contract. Hence, at the
occurrence of default his percentage change in wealth,
dWl(t)
Wl(t¡); should equal the percentage
write-oﬀ on the debt contract ·D(t): Intuitively, this is the condition that allows us to pin








Condition 3: By construction the dynamics of the RA’s marginal utility equate with the
ﬁrst agent’s state price density process. The continuous part of the dynamics of the RA’s
marginal utility is given by the following equation. For this continuous component, Á(t) and































































Condition 4: Comparing the deterministic terms of equations 4 and 14 leads to the fourth
condition, and thereby to the identiﬁcation of the interest rate ¹D(t):
These four conditions have a unique solution, as summarized in Proposition 1, and are the
basis of our equilibrium characterization. Financial wealth is allocated either towards the
claim on the output process V (t) or the sovereign debt contract D(t). It can easily be veriﬁed
that the dynamics of the wealth process in equation (7), equate with the wealth dynamics
generated from the process of V (t) and D(t),
dWi(t)
Wi(t¡)
= (:::)dt + ¼V;i(t)¾edB(t) + (¼V;i(t)·e + ¼D;i(t)·D(t))dN(t;¸i(t)) (17)
given the equilibrium allocations ¼V;b(t) = 1 + Á(t¡); ¼V;l(t) = 0; ¼D;b(t) = ¡Á(t¡); and
¼D;l(t) = 1:
Proposition 1 The interest rate b ¹D(t); the risk-adjusted intensity for the borrowing agent
¸Q;b(t); the risk-adjusted intensity for the lender ¸Q;l(t); and the write-oﬀ in case of default
·D(t), are given in closed form by
b ¹D(t) = b ¹e ¡ ¾
2
e(1 + Á(t¡)) +
1
1 + Á(t¡)
[¸b(t) ¡ ¸Q;b(t)] +
Á(t¡)
1 + Á(t¡)
[¸l(t) ¡ ¸Q;l(t)] ¡ ®(t);
(18)
¸Q;b(t) =
(·D(t)(¡1 + Á(t¡)·D(t) ¡ (1 + Á(t¡))·e) ¡ 1)¸b(t)
Á(t¡)·D(t) ¡ (1 + Á(t¡))·e ¡ 1
; (19)
¸Q;l(t) =
(1 + ·D(t) + ·D(t)2)¸l(t)
1 + ·D(t)
; (20)












where ¯(t) = ((1 + Á(t¡))·e)¸b(t) ¡ (1 + (1 + Á(t¡))·e ¡ Á(t¡))¸l(t);
and ¸(t) = ¸b(t) ¡ ¸l(t):
The interest rate in equation (18) carries an intuitive interpretation. First, if there was
no uncertainty in the economy, lending and borrowing would obviously be riskless at the
exogenous growth rate b ¹e of the economy. Second, adding Brownian motion risk results in
a precautionary savings term, ¾2
e(1 + Á(t¡)); which takes into account that the ﬁrst agent’s
consumption policy carries the Brownian motion risk of the entire dividend stream. Third,
adding rare event risk adds two new terms, one for each agent. This is each agent’s wealth-
weighted contribution to the rare event premium in the economy, the diﬀerence between the
physical and the risk-adjusted intensity. For the lender, the risk-adjusted frequency is strictly
higher than the belief about the physical frequency. This is expected, as this diﬀerence is
a measure of the lender’s required risk premium. However, for the borrower, the diﬀerence
between the belief about the physical frequency and risk-adjusted frequency can be negative.
The eﬀect can be so large that the borrower is willing to pay an interest rate to the lender,
which is higher than the growth rate in fundamentals b ¹e. As mentioned above, the borrower
and the lender determine a “shadow” risk free interest rate of the sovereign country, given
by r(t) = b ¹D(t) ¡ ·D(t)(·D(t)¸i(t) ¡ ¸Q;i(t)). Consequently, each agent’s (instantaneous)
credit spread is given by
vi(t) = ·D(t)(·D(t)¸i(t) ¡ ¸Q;i(t)): (23)
By decomposing vi(t) into the expected loss and the default risk premium due to rare event
risk, we notice that the expected loss obviously is an agent-speciﬁc term, but borrower and
lender agree on the risk premium given by vi(t) + ·D(t)¸i(t): Finally, the term ®(t) enters
the drift of the state price density process, such that the only marketable security, the debt
contract D(t); satisﬁes the martingale property as stated in Proposition 2. Equivalently, this
result says that the debt contract satisﬁes the Euler equation of asset pricing.
Proposition 2 The deﬂated process for security D(t) satisﬁes the martingale property under
each agent’s measure Pi; such that Ei;t[´i(s)D(s)] = ´i(t)D(t); for all s > t.
15A well understood benchmark of this economy is the case in which there is no rare event
risk, given by a zero jump size in the exogenous process, ·e = 0: In this case, one agent has
access to the entire dividend stream and can borrow through a riskless money market. The
second agent engages as a lender in the money market, like in the case of limited participation
as in Basak and Cuoco (1998).
Corollary 1 As the jump in the exogenous jump size approaches zero, ·e ! 0; the borrowing
contract becomes locally riskless, i.e.
dD(t)
D(t¡)
! r(t)dt; D(0) > 0;
in which the interest rate is given by
b ¹D(t) = r(t) = b ¹e ¡ ¾
2
e(1 + Á(t));




as in Basak and Cuoco (1998). Furthermore, the equilibrium characteristics in Proposition
1 converge to ¸Q;i(t) = ¸i(t); ·D(t) = 0, ®(t) = 0; and the state price density process to
d´i(t)
´i(t¡)
= ¡r(t)dt ¡ µi(t)dB(t):
The second benchmark of this economy is the case in which there is rare event risk, but
homogeneous beliefs about the likelihood as formalized in the following Corollary. Although
b ¹D(t) has the same functional form as without rare event risk, it can not be interpreted as
a riskless interest rate. This only says that the adjustment for the precautionary savings
motive as a response to small economic risk is the same as in an economy without rare event
risk.
Corollary 2 For the case in which ¸b(t) = ¸l(t); the write-oﬀ in case of a rare event (de-
fault) is equal to the exogenous jump,
·D(t) = ·e;
16agents agree on the risk-adjusted frequencies,
¸Q;b(t) = ¸Q;l(t) =




the interest rate simpliﬁes to
b ¹D(t) = b ¹e ¡ ¾
2
e(1 + Á(t¡)) + ¸i(t) ¡ ¸Q;i(t) ¡ ®(t)
= b ¹e ¡ ¾
2
e(1 + Á(t¡));




Before moving on to the results discussion, we emphasize some features of the agent-
speciﬁc pricing operator, ´i(t): It satisﬁes good market clearing, cb(t)+ cl(t) = (yb´b(t))
¡1 +
(yl´l(t))
¡1 = e(t), and the deﬂated price process of the only tradable security, the sovereign
debt contract, is a martingale under each agent’s belief, Ei;t[´i(s)D(s)] = ´i(t)D(t): Most
important for our particular problem, the choice of ´i(t) allows us to determine the size of
the write-oﬀ, ·D(t); which is the jump size of a non-dividend paying security, in equilibrium.





is strictly bounded below at -1, and the risk-adjusted frequencies ¸Q;i(t) are strictly positive.
3 Analysis and Results
The ﬁrst thing to learn from this pricing exercise is that the borrower’s debt contract cannot
be a riskless contract. It is always optimal for the borrower to shift some exposure generated
from rare event risk to the lender, i.e. default on the debt contract. Intuitively this is
not a surprising result, as the debt contract is the ﬁnancial instrument that allows the
levered borrower to hedge against the possibility of negative ﬁnancial wealth. This result is
formalized in Proposition 3.13
13This Proposition has an equivalent interpretation in the context of the benchmark setup without rare
event risk as formulated by Basak and Cuoco (1989). It says than an equilibrium solution based on a jump-
diﬀusive process instead of a pure diﬀusive process under the same set of ﬁnancial securities as in their paper
17Proposition 3 The debt contract is a risky security with non-zero default risk, such that
¡1 < ·D(t) < 0; (24)
for all Á(t) > 0;¸b(t) > 0;¸l(t) > 0:
The write-oﬀ of the debt contract implements the risk sharing rule for rare event risk, con-
ditioning on how frequent the borrower and the lender believe these will occur. The output
process of the borrower faces a negative shock of magnitude ·e: Consequently both borrower
and lender lose ﬁnancial wealth in case of a rare event (default). Proposition 4 studies how
heterogeneity in beliefs about the rare event aﬀects each agent’s wealth in relative terms.
Ex-ante, the agent who has a higher belief about the likelihood is willing to accept less expo-
sure. This leads to the interesting result that although both agents lose in terms of ﬁnancial
wealth, the more “cautious” agent gains in relative terms, compared to the less cautious
agent at the occurrence of default.
Proposition 4 Each agent’s exposure with respect to rare event risk as a fraction of ﬁnancial











The lending agent loses the fraction ·D(t) = ·Wl(t), the borrowing agent loses the fraction
(1 + Á(t))·e ¡ Á(t)·D(t) = ·Wb(t): Furthermore,
If ¸b(t) = ¸l(t); then ·Wb(t) = ·Wl(t) < 0;
if ¸b(t) > ¸l(t); then 0 > ·Wb(t) > ·Wl(t);
if ¸b(t) < ¸l(t); then ·Wb(t) < ·Wl(t) < 0:
At the occurrence of default, if the borrower and the lender agree on the likelihood, then
relative wealth does not change; if ¸b(t) > ¸l(t) then the borrower gains relative to the
lender, if ¸b(t) < ¸l(t) then the borrower loses relative to the lender in terms of ﬁnancial
wealth.
cannot be obtained. As mentioned in the introduction, the intuition for this result can also be derived from
a portfolio selection perspective. Once a price systems faces rare events, a levered portfolio optimizer will
not be able to quickly reverse his portfolio in order to avoid negative wealth. Liu, Longstaﬀ and Pan (2003)
show that the only way to hedge this inability not to continuously control the portfolio is to not engage in
a levered position.
183.1 Interest Rate and Write-Oﬀ
The dependencies of b ¹D(t) on the beliefs about the likelihood of a rare event (default) are
shown with a numerical example. In line with the point estimates for emerging market
countries in the introduction, we impose the following parameters for model primitives. The
deterministic growth rate of the economy is assumed to be 6%, with an annualized volatility
of 6%, and a possible extreme shock to economic fundamentals with a magnitude of -20%.
The less developed country has borrowed 50% in terms of value of its economy from a
lender, leading to a wealth ratio Á(t¡) of 1: For ease of interpretation, we express our results
based on annualized default probabilities, dpi; instead of Poisson frequencies. The annual
default probability given by a Poisson distribution with instantaneous intensity ¸i is given
by dpi = 1 ¡ exp(¡¸i): The left (right) graph in Figure 1 shows the level of the interest
rate (write-oﬀ parameter), while the subjective beliefs about the annual likelihood of default
borrower and lender vary between 20% and 60%. While these values seems high in absolute
terms, they are in line with a range of default probabilities extracted from bond prices issued
by Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela (see Narag (2004)).14
Figure 1 contains a surprising result on each dimension. First, the interest rate is increasing
in the belief of the borrowing country. This increase can be dramatic in that the borrowing
agent pays a higher rate to the lender than the growth rate of the economy – in our example
up to a level of 16%. This is possible as the lender is able to write-oﬀ more than the actual
negative shock in the economic fundamentals in case of default, as shown in the right graph
of Figure 1. This result is surprising, since the well-studied endowment economies based
on homogeneity of beliefs, or an economy without rare event risk would generate interest
rates strictly lower than the growth rate, see Corollaries 1 and 2. Second, the interest
rate is decreasing in the belief of the lending agent. In a reduced form model in which
the write-oﬀ is assumed to be constant, a higher anticipation of the probability of default
would lead to a higher interest rate on the debt contract. Again, our result stems from the
endogeneity of the write-oﬀ parameter. The write-oﬀ is less negative for higher values of the
14Narag (2004) extracts risk-neutral default probabilities from emerging market bond prices between 1997
and 2001, based on two reduced-form models. Since those are risk neutral probabilities, the corresponding
physical default probabilities will be strictly lower in an environment where default risk is systematic, and






























































Figure 1: Interest rate and write-oﬀ parameter. The left graph shows the level of the interest
rate ¹D(t) in %, the right graph shows the level of the write-oﬀ ·D(t) in %, as a function of the
likelihood of default. The borrower’s belief, dp(borrower), is shown on the x-axis, the lender’s
belief, dp(lender), is shown on the y-axis, between the values of 20% and 60%. Other parameters
for the economy are b ¹e = :06; ¾e = :06;·e = ¡:20;Á(t¡) = 1:
lending agent’s belief. In equilibrium, the lending agent expects a higher recovery rate the
higher her anticipated degree of default risk. A higher recovery rate overcompensates higher
anticipated default risk leading to a lower interest rate.15
For homogenous beliefs (the 45 degree line on the x-y dimension) neither the interest rate,
nor the level of write-oﬀ depend on the frequencies of any agent. While this seems counterin-
tuitive, it is consistent with standard models based on logarithmic preferences, and already
documented in Corollary 2. For homogeneous beliefs, the interest rate is also independent
of the jump size ·e. If dpb <dpl; then the more negative ·e, the lower the interest rate; if
dpb >dpl; then the more negative ·e, the higher the interest rate. We ﬁnd the well-known
comparative statics for the interest rate with respect to the deterministic growth rate, the
instantaneous volatility and the jump size. For any given weight Á(t); the higher the growth
rate b ¹e; the higher the rate of borrowing. The higher the degree of instantaneous volatility of
small risks, ¾e; the lower the rate of borrowing. These results are equivalent to an economy
without default risk, see Corollary 1.
15In addition to the short term debt contract D(t); we have also computed long-term term structures based
on the equilibrium pricing kernels ´i(t); and the equilibrium write-oﬀ ·D(t) in case of default. The general
ﬁnding is our model can produce upward-sloping as well as downward-sloping term structures, depending on



























































































Figure 2: Adjustment of the interest rate and the write-oﬀ in default times. The left
graph shows the absolute change in the interest rate ¹D(t); the right graph shows the absolute
change in the write-oﬀ ·D(t), as a function of the likelihood of default. The borrower’s belief,
dp(borrower), is shown on the x-axis, the lender’s belief, dp(lender), is shown on the y-axis, between
the values of 20% and 60%. Other parameters for the economy are b ¹e = :06; ¾e = :06;·e =
¡:20;Á(t¡) = 1:
Since this is a dynamic model, we can ask how the interest rate and the write-oﬀ parameter
adjust at a default. The right graph of Figure 1 already provides the necessary information
to answer that question. Consistent with Proposition 4, if dpb <dpl; then ·e is more negative
than the write-oﬀ ·D(t): The lender gains in terms of wealth relative to the borrower, and
Á(t¡) jumps to a value higher at the occurrence of default. If dpb >dpl; then ·e is less
negative than the write-oﬀ ·D(t): In this case, the borrower gains in terms of wealth relative
to the lender, and Á(t¡) drops to a value smaller at the occurrence of default.
The left graph of Figure 2 shows the adjustment of the interest rate in levels. A large eﬀect
can be observed for the case in which dpb >dpl: While the belief of the borrower is high at
60%, and the belief of the lender is low at 20%, the interest rate would jump upwards about
2% at the occurrence of default. In this case, the lender has lost ﬁnancial wealth relative to
the borrower, so the borrower’s belief matters more leading to a higher compensation in the
interest rate. For the region dpb <dpl the eﬀect is also strictly positive, but smaller in levels.
The write-oﬀ parameter unambiguously jumps downward at the occurrence of default as can
be seen in the right graph of Figure 2. For example, while the belief of the borrower is high
at 60%, and the belief of the lender is low at 20%, the write-oﬀ would jump down about
21-2%. In this case, the increased interest rate goes hand in hand with a higher write-oﬀ. For
homogenous beliefs there is no change, as agents lose wealth equally in relative terms, again
in line with the results in Proposition 4.16
An important result of our study stems from the variability of the interest rate and write-oﬀ
in non-default times, as regular (small) economic risk of the borrower generates uncertainty
in equilibrium properties. Due to the nonlinear structure of b ¹D(t); we compute the de-
gree of variability numerically. Interest rate variability in non-default times is given by the






c = [:::]dt + ¾b ¹D(t)dB(t); (25)




The instantaneous volatility of the write-oﬀ parameter is computed equivalently. As typical
in an exchange economy like ours, interest rates can become zero or negative, and the
instantaneous volatility of percentage changes
¾b ¹D(t)
b ¹D(t) is ill-deﬁned at b ¹D(t) = 0: However, the
level of the interest rate for our numerical example is not close to reaching the value zero,
and for reasons of interpretation we decide to show the more intuitive measure
¾b ¹D(t)
b ¹D(t) ; the
instantaneous volatility of percentage changes, in Figure 3.
The interest rate contains a small degree of volatility in the case of homogeneity. This is in
line with an economy without any rare event risk and limited participation, see Corollaries 1
and 2. Most important, heterogeneity matters dramatically for the degree of volatility. In our
example, the maximum volatility occurs for low default probabilities of the lender, and high
default probabilities of the borrower. In this case, the volatility of the interest rate increases
to 6%, which is several times higher than the value under homogeneity, or no default. This
result stems from the joint eﬀect of limited participation and heterogenous beliefs. We also
observe that the direction of volatility can change due to a change in sign of
@b ¹D(t)
@Á(t¡): In general,
16The adjustments described here are entirely due to a wealth eﬀect, as we assume that the borrower’s
and the lender’s subjective beliefs do not change at default. A possible eﬀect of (Bayesian) learning and/or
a change in the true frequency would add an additional layer to this analysis. Although we do not generate
a hedging demand against updating beliefs with logarithmic preferences, a revision of the level ¸b(t) and







































































Figure 3: Instantaneous volatility of the interest rate and the write-oﬀ in non-default
times. The left graph shows the level of volatility of percentage changes in the interest rate
¾b ¹D(t) in %, the right graph shows the level of the volatility of percentage changes in the write-oﬀ
parameter, as a function of the likelihood of default. The borrower’s belief, dp(borrower), is shown
on the x-axis, the lender’s belief, dp(lender), is shown on the y-axis, between the values of 20% and
60%. Other parameters for the economy are b ¹e = :06; ¾e = :06;·e = ¡:20;Á(t¡) = 1:
a small positive shock in the output process makes the borrower wealthier relative to the
lender due to the “levered” position, equivalent to a negative innovation in Á(t). However,
this can have oﬀsetting eﬀects for the variability of the interest rate. The interest rate itself
consists of multiple components — the riskless interest rate and a credit spread consisting
of the expected loss and a default risk premium. We investigate these components in more
detail in terms of level and variability in the next section. For completeness, the volatility
of the write-oﬀ is displayed in the right graph of Figure 3.
3.2 Credit Spreads and Default Risk Premium
The credit spread, vi(t); implicit in the interest rate is agent-speciﬁc as the borrower and
the lender face diﬀerent “shadow” riskless interest rates. We ﬁnd agreement between agents
on the degree of the default risk premium. Figure 4 shows the level of the credit spreads,
the default risk premium, as well as the instantaneous volatility in non-default times for the










and since all levels are bounded below at zero we present results for
¾vi(t)
vi(t) ; the instantaneous
volatility of percentage changes. The credit spread from the borrower’s perspective is in-
creasing in her own belief, but decreasing in the lender’s belief, in line with the dependencies
of the interest rate itself. However, the credit spread from the lender’s perspective is increas-
ing in her own belief, and increasing in the borrower’s belief. We notice the large magnitude
of the credit spreads — upto 32% from the borrower’s perspective and upto 23% from the
lender’s perspective — and the level of the real riskless interest rate can be negative.
The risk premium contained in both of the spreads is consistently increasing in the belief
of the borrower, but ambiguous in the belief of the lender. Interestingly, for low levels of
the borrower’s belief (as can been seen for a default probability of 20%), the risk premium
is decreasing in the belief of the lender. This equilibrium eﬀect is linked to the endogeneity
of the write-oﬀ parameter. Recalling from Figure 1, the write-oﬀ parameter becomes less
negative in this region, almost approaching a riskless asset, and in turn lowers the endogenous
risk premium.
As before, the two main ingredients of the model result in a combined eﬀect and lead to
signiﬁcant results regarding variability. Under homogeneity in beliefs, we do not observe any
variation in credit spreads and the risk premium. Hence, the (small) variation in the interest
rate observed earlier even under homogeneity is entirely due to variation in the “shadow”
riskless interest rate. However, under heterogeneity in beliefs, small shocks to the borrower’s
output process generate large variation in credit spreads and the risk premium. The degree of
variability is determined by the degree of limited participation in the borrower’s economy, and
the direction is determined by the sign of
@vi(t)
@Á(t¡). In our numerical example, if the borrower’s
default probability is higher than the lender’s probability then the risk premium’s volatility
can reach 7%; if the lender’s default probability is higher than the borrower’s probability





































































































































































































Figure 4: Level and instantaneous volatility of the credit spread and the risk premium
in non-default times. The left graphs show the borrower’s credit spread, the lender’s credit
spread, and the default risk premium in levels. The right graphs show the volatility of percentage
changes of the same properties. Results are presented as a function of the likelihood of default. The
borrower’s belief, dp(borrower), is shown on the x-axis, the lender’s belief, dp(lender), is shown on
the y-axis, between the values of 20% and 60%. Other parameters for the economy are b ¹e = :06;
¾e = :06;·e = ¡:20;Á(t¡) = 1:
254 Calibration
The country of Ecuador is an example where severe shocks to economic fundamentals led
to an enormous burden to repay interest and principal on external debt. The country’s
GDP suﬀered from the El Nino weather conditions, and further decreased signiﬁcantly in
1998 and 1999 due to decreasing commodity prices and weaker export revenues. According to
Deutsche Bank Research, the GDP decreased from 24 to 17 billion U.S. dollars between 1997
and 1999, with the most dramatic drop of about -20% between 1998 and 1999. According to
Worldbank statistics, the eﬀect was a total shock of -24% measured in terms of per capita
GDP. Hence we consider ·e = ¡0:24: In non-default times, the Worldbank per capita GDP
time series between 1980 and 2002 had an annual standard deviation of 6.25% and a mean
growth rate of 2% per annum. Hence we choose ¾e = 0:0625 and b ¹e = 0:02:
The value of external debt had increased to almost 16.3 billion U.S. dollar in 1999, represent-
ing 98% of GDP, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit had risen to -4.6% of GDP. Ecuador ﬁrst did not pay
interest on one of its Brady bonds on August 28, 1999, and then oﬃcially suspended payment
on half of the interest to be paid on its Brady bonds on October 1, 1999. Almost 6.1 billion
U.S. dollars of external debt in 1999 were held in securitized Brady bonds or Eurobonds. In
particular, Ecuador had issued 4 Brady bonds in 1995 with a face value of 5.6 billion U.S.
dollars, and two Eurobonds with a total face value of 500 million U.S. dollars. Default on
these bonds was resolved through a successful exchange oﬀer made on July 27, 2000. The
values received through the exchange oﬀer can be interpreted as the recovery values on the 6
bonds. Brady bondholders received between 41% and 55% recovery of face value; Eurobond
holders received 53% recovery of face value, according to Hund and Kulesz (2004.)
We choose the year prior to the impact of El Nino, 1997, as the basis for our calibration. A
parameter to be calibrated is the degree of leverage, Á(t); or the ratio of Ecuador’s ﬁnancial
wealth held by the lender relative to the borrower. The value of Ecuador’s external debt in
1997 was 15.6 billion U.S. dollars. A potential proxy for wealth held by the borrower net of
debt is Ecuador’s stock market capitalization, which was 2.13 billion U.S. dollars as of 1997.
While this would lead to a ratio of 7.32, one would also have to consider other sources of
ﬁnancial wealth not accounted for in the value of Ecuador’s two stock exchanges. Hence,
we calibrate our model to slightly more conservative values, and decide to show results for
Á(t) = 6; Á(t) = 4; and Á(t) = 2:
26Interest rates generated in an exchange economy model like ours are real interest rates.
Information on the time series of real interest rates from emerging market countries is very
limited, and we calibrate our model to observed credit spreads, a measure potentially less
impacted by inﬂation. A monthly data set of historical interest rates since 1995 is reported by
the Bank of Ecuador (and obtained through Datastream). It contains a short term interest
rate paid to a lender oﬀering funds to Ecuador, based on U.S. dollar currency. We subtract
the U.S. Treasury Bill rate, and consider the diﬀerence as the observed credit spread from
the perspective of the lender. The descriptive statistics for the time period between 1995
and 1997 are a mean credit spread of 7.62%, a minimum of 5.75%, a maximum of 11.57%,
and an annual standard deviation of percentage changes of 23%.
Along the lines of our theoretical study, we ask three question to be answered by our cali-
bration. The borrower’s and lender’s belief about default are not directly observable. Hence,
we ﬁrst extract the pairs of (dpb;dpl) that would generate a credit spread of 7.62%. Second,
we ask what debt write-oﬀ levels are implied by the answer to the ﬁrst question, in order to
draw inference about recovery rates from a pure risk sharing perspective. Third, we ask what
levels of volatility of credit spreads in pre-default times can be explained by heterogeneity
in beliefs, given Ecuador’s highly levered economy.
Our calibration results are summarized in the three graphs in Figure 5. The upper
graph shows the pairs of probabilities that generate a credit spread of 7.62%. A probability
of approximately 21% leads to this value under homogeneous beliefs. Interestingly, this is
close to the range of values extracted by Narag (2004) from Ecuador debt prices in 1997
between 25% and 40%. Please note that the author’s results are risk-neutral values. They
can only serve as an upper bound to the real counterpart, used in our calibration, in the
presence of systematic risk. Relaxing the assumption of homogeneity, a continuum of pairs of
probabilities can be found to match one statistical moment in observed data. For example,
for the leverage ratio of Á(t) = 6; a lender’s belief of 20% and a borrower’s belief of 40%, or
a lender’s belief of 33% and a borrower’s belief of 5% would have generated the same credit
spread in equilibrium.
The middle graph in Figure 5 shows that the implied write-oﬀ values are fairly insensitive
to the degree of leverage. More importantly, within the range of probabilities extracted from
the ﬁrst step, write-oﬀ values between -15% and -26% can be supported by a rare event with
an impact of ·e = ¡0:24: Given the primitives of our model, this result can be compared to





















































































Figure 5: Calibration results - The upper graph shows the pairs of (dpb;dpl) that generate
a credit spread of 7.62% given ·e = ¡:24: The solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond to
Á(t) = 6; 4; and 2, respectively. The middle graph shows write-oﬀ ·D that correspond to the
pairs of (dpb;dpl) extracted in the ﬁrst step. The lower graph shows the corresponding level of
instantaneous volatility in credit spreads expressed in absolute values given ¾e = :0625:
28observed recovery rates mentioned above. It suggests that recovery rates (write-oﬀ values)
on external debt, interpreted from a risk sharing perspective, should have been higher (lower)
in the case of the Ecuador default.
The lower graph shows the implied levels of volatilities of credit spreads in pre-default
times, expressed in absolute values. One can see clearly how variability in credit spreads is
positively associated with a higher degree of leverage. As expected, homogeneity in default
probabilities of approximately 21% generates no uncertainty in credit spreads. However, for
a realistic level of leverage in 1997, Á(t) = 6; a lender’s belief of 33% and a borrower’s belief
of 5% would generate 23% volatility in credit spreads, which is precisely the descriptive
level observed in our data set. While we are not claiming that heterogeneity in beliefs
should explain all observed volatility in credit spreads, our results do, however, suggest that
heterogeneity in beliefs can explain a signiﬁcant fraction of Ecuador’s observed volatility.17
For example, a more moderate degree of dispersion, a lender’s belief of 26% and a borrower’s
belief of 10%, can explain 10% volatility in credit spreads. Due to joint determination, this
would have implied a write-oﬀ of -20% on debt, in line with a pre-default credit spread of
7.62%.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the equilibrium problem of pricing a debt contract in an emerging
market when the sovereign borrower faces both rare event and regular economic risk. The
equilibrium is studied in the context of two natural market imperfections. First, the lender
faces limited participation in the sovereign’s economy by being able to invest only through
the debt contract. Second, the lender and the borrower have heterogeneous beliefs about
the likelihood of a rare event that triggers default by the borrower. We solve for the rate of
interest, the credit spread, the risk premium, the write-oﬀ in case of default, and the dynamics
of the debt contract in non-default times. The combination of limited participation and
heterogeneous beliefs is shown to have strong implications for these equilibrium quantities.
Additionally, our analysis highlights the importance of jointly modeling the debt contracts
interest rate and recovery rate in that they are both closely linked in equilibrium.
17Other potential sources to generate amplifying eﬀects in volatility are learning and updating of beliefs,
or uncertainty in inﬂation not captured in our calibration to nominal credit spreads.
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337 Appendix
7.1 The Economy with Small Foreign Direct Investment
In this appendix we analyze a perturbation of the original economy by allowing for a small
foreign direct investment (FDI). This is a form of investment in which an investor does not
participate in the borrower’s economy indirectly through the debt contract, but directly by
investing in the economy’s production possibilities. The goal of this perturbation analysis
is to understand how equilibrium properties adjust once we relax the original assumption of
having zero FDI, or a limited participation constraint of the lender on small economic risk.
Our results in Proposition 1 are derived from four conditions presented in Section 2.
To analyze the perturbation, we show how these four conditions adjust once we include a
small FDI, and then compute the new equilibrium properties numerically. To do so, we
retain a “closed” economy, and divert a small fraction of lender’s investment directly into
the endowment stream V (t). By construction the fraction of the lender’s wealth invested
in V (t) is now ¼V;l(t) = ²; previously ¼V;l(t) = 0: With respect to the two sources of risk
inherent in the economy, the lender now has direct exposure to Brownian motion risk, i.e.
small economic risk not related to default. The lender’s market price of Brownian motion
risk supporting this allocation is given by µl(t) = ²¾e. Although this perturbation does not
instantly change the wealth ratio between the borrower and the lender Á(t), it’s interpretation
as a “leverage ratio” of the country becomes diluted. More general, the ratio Á(t) is now the
fraction of wealth held either directly through FDI or indirectly through a debt contract,
relative to the fraction held by the borrower.
Since the borrower and the lender together bear the entire amount of risk, we can determine




1+Á(t)µl(t) = ¾e: This leads to a borrower’s market price of Brownian motion risk
given by µb(t) = ¾e(1 + Á(t) ¡ Á(t)²). The general form of the agent-speciﬁc pricing kernel






(¸b(t) ¡ ¸Q;b(t)) ¡ (¸l(t) ¡ ¸Q;l(t)) + µ
2
l (t) ¡ µl(t)µb(t)
¤
dt (27)







34with ¸Q;b(t) and ¸Q;l(t) having the same interpretation as before.
Condition 1: This condition ensures that each agent’s present value of the endowment
stream equals V (t) = e(t)(T ¡ t). For consistency, Á(t) needs to satisfy the martingale
property under the borrower’s measure Pb; and hence
¸Q;l(t) ¡ ¸Q;b(t) ¡ ¸l(t) + µ
2




with µl(t) and µb(t) stipulated as above.
Condition 2: The rare event in the lender’s wealth process has two components in case of
default. The ﬁrst one is generated from the FDI and equals the jump of the output process,






= ²·e + (1 ¡ ²)·D(t): (29)
Condition 3: In Section 2, this condition was given through the comparison of the Pois-
son terms of the borrower’s state price density with the marginal utility of the RA. This
is equivalent to determining the Poisson terms of the borrower’s wealth process given his
allocation toward Poisson risk. Hence, the equivalent to Condition 2 but for the borrowing






= ((1 + Á(t) ¡ Á(t)²))·e + (Á(t)² ¡ Á(t))·D(t): (30)
Equations 28, 29, and 30 uniquely determine the write-oﬀ parameter ·D(t); and the two
risk-adjusted default frequencies.
Condition 4: The remaining condition determines the rate of interest on the debt contract.
As in the original economy, this can be done by comparing the deterministic terms of the
borrower’s state price density process with the marginal utility of the RA. Though the
functional form of the state price density process remains unchanged, the deterministic term











1+Á(t¡)[¸b(t) ¡ ¸Q;b(t) ¡ ¸l(t) + ¸Q;l(t)
+µ2
l (t) ¡ µl(t)µb(t) ¡ (µl(t) ¡ µb(t))¾e] ¡ b ¹e + ¾2
e
#
dt + [:::]: (31)
We can numerically compute the equilibrium properties, and learn about the impact of
FDI on the level of the interest rate and the write-oﬀ parameter. Overall, the interest rate
can increase and decrease with FDI depending on the degree of heterogeneity in beliefs about
default. The interest rate with FDI is higher for homogeneity or small levels of heterogeneity.
This eﬀect is driven by a smaller precautionary savings term in the interest rate, as there is
more optimal risk sharing with FDI compared to no FDI with respect to Brownian motion
risk. For a larger degree of heterogeneity this is still true, but this eﬀect is overcompensated
by a larger risk adjustment with respect to Poisson risk, leading to a lower interest rate on
the debt contract. The impact on the level of the write-oﬀ parameter is ambiguous. Under
homogeneity, and for the cases in which ¸b(t) > ¸l(t) the eﬀect is very small. This is not
surprising as the lender even with a small FDI anticipates a lower likelihood for rare events,
and is willing to write oﬀ a fraction larger than the shock to fundamentals, see Section 3.
The impact is more severe for the case ¸b(t) < ¸l(t): The lender participates directly in
the shock ·e through the FDI, and is willing to accept an even lower write-oﬀ on the debt
contract compared to zero FDI.
We conclude this extension by re-calibrating the model to the case of Ecuador. According
to Worldbank statistics, the average FDI as a percentage of GDP between 1970 and 2000
was 2% for Ecuador. In the base year of our calibration, 1997, Ecuador debt held externally
was roughly 65% of GDP, hence we choose ² = :02=:65 = :03: As before, we ﬁrst extract
the pairs of (dpb;dpl) that would generate a credit spread of 7.62%. Then we study the
levels of implied write-oﬀ values in case of default, and the levels of implied credit spreads
in pre-default times. The adjustments in calibration results compared to zero percent FDI
are displayed in Figure 6.
The impact on write-oﬀ values is very small, between -.02% and .04%. For the region in
which the borrower’s belief is higher than the lenders belief, dpb >dpl, the write-oﬀ decreases.
It increases for the opposite case of dpb <dpl. Under homogeneity, the write-oﬀ value is not
aﬀected by a small degree of FDI. The eﬀect is slightly larger on the volatility of credit
spreads. For example, for a realistic level of leverage in 1997, Á(t) = 6, and given a lender’s
36belief of 26%, a 3% FDI decreases the volatility in credit spreads by .45% from 10% to
9.55%. The higher the degree of leverage, the larger the eﬀect due to FDI. Most interesting
is the negative direction of adjustment in volatility. The intuition for this result is the eﬀect
of more complete risk sharing with respect to regular economic risk, and less limitation in
participation. The higher the degree of FDI, the more the lender participates in regular risk
of the economy, and the less volatile is the endogenous state variable Á(t) determined by
[µl(t) ¡ µb(t)]: Overall, our original results are fairly robust to the inclusion of a small FDI.





























































































Figure 6: Calibration results with FDI - The upper graph shows the adjustment in implied
write-oﬀ values due to the inclusion of 3% FDI, ² = :03: The lower graph shows the adjustment in
volatilities of credit spreads due to the inclusion of 3% FDI. Results are based on pairs of (dpb;dpl)
that generate a credit spread of 7.62% given ·e = ¡:24 and ¾e = :0625: The solid, dashed, and
dotted lines correspond to Á(t) = 6; 4; and 2, respectively.
387.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. The deﬂated process for D(t) is given by
d(´i(t)D(t)) = D(t)d´i(t)
c + ´i(t)dD(t)




= ¡®(t)dt + (¸i(t) ¡ ¸Q;i(t))dt ¡ µi(t)dB(t))
+
µ





For the martingale property to be satisﬁed, we show that every increment step between s







= ¡®(t)dt ¡ ¸Q;i(t)dt + (¡·D(t)¸i(t) + ¸Q;i(t))(·D(t) + 1)dt
= (¡®(t) ¡ ·
2
D(t)¸i(t) ¡ ·D(t)¸i(t) + ¸Q;i(t)·D(t))dt = 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. The result is immediate from Proposition 1 for the case
of homogeneous beliefs, ¸b(t) = ¸l(t). We ﬁrst show the upper boundary ·D(t) < 0: Sup-
pose ¸b(t) < ¸l(t); then the diﬀerence ¸b(t) ¡ ¸l(t) = ¸(t) < 0; and since the jump size
·e < 0; the square root term in equation (22)
q
4Á(t)(1 + Á(t))·e¸b(t)¸(t) + ¯(t)2 > j¯(t)j:
As ¯(t) is negative and Á(t) positive, the result ·D(t) < 0 follows. For the case ¸b(t) >
¸l(t); the diﬀerence ¸(t) > 0; resulting in
q
4Á(t)(1 + Á(t))·e¸b(t)¸(t) + ¯(t)2 < j¯(t)j; and
again the result ·D(t) < 0 follows. Proving the lower boundary is equivalent to showing q
4Á(t)(1 + Á(t))·e¸b(t)¸(t) + ¯(t)2 < ¡2Á(t)¸(t) ¡ ¯(t); assuming ¸b(t) < ¸l(t): The rhs
and lhs are equal for homogeneous beliefs, and since the gradient for the lhs is negative at
¸b(t); and the gradient for the rhs positive at ¸b(t), the result follows since ¸b(t) > ¸l(t):
Assuming the reverse, ¸b(t) > ¸l(t); the inequality reverses, as well as the direction of the
gradients, and the desired result follows.
39Proof of Proposition 4. The expression for ·Wi(t) is taken from equation (7), and
the agent-speciﬁc values follow directly from equilibrium conditions, in particular that both




·e: The case of ¸b(t) = ¸l(t); is trivial, as ·D(t) = ·e: If ¸b(t) > ¸l(t); then ·D(t) <
·e; but since ·Wl(t) = ·D(t) by construction, the result ·Wb(t) > ·Wl(t) follows. The
argument reverses for the case ¸b(t) < ¸l(t): For a complete argument it remains to show
that ·D(t) < ·e in the case of ¸b(t) > ¸l(t); and ·D(t) > ·e in the case of ¸b(t) < ¸l(t):
Without loss of generality we can ﬁx ¸l(t); and determine the partial derivative of ·D(t) with
respect to ¸b(t); @·D(t)=@¸b(t): After simplifying the expression, the sign of @·D(t)=@¸b(t)
is entirely determined by the term ¡(·e(¡1+Á(t))+Á(t))¸b(t)+(¡1+·e(¡1+Á(t)))¸l(t)+ q
4Á(t)(1 + Á(t))·e¸b(t)¸(t) + (¯(t))
2; which is strictly negative for all ¸b(t) 6= ¸l(t); and
Á(t) > 0: Hence, the write-oﬀ in case of default ·D(t) is monotonically decreasing in ¸b(t);
and must be less negative than ·e if ¸b(t) < ¸l(t); and vice versa. The statement about
relative wealth follows from
·Wl(t)+1
·Wb(t)+1 ¡1; which is the jump size of the weighting process Á(t)
in equation (10).
40